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Abstract. We build upon recent work [Kleinberg and Oren, 2014, Kleinberg et al., 2016, 2017] that
considers present biased agents, who place more weight on costs they must incur now than costs they
will incur in the future. They consider a graph theoretic model where agents must complete a task
and show that present biased agents can take exponentially more expensive paths than optimal. We
propose a theoretical model that adds competition into the mix – two agents compete to finish a
task first. We show that, in a wide range of settings, a small amount of competition can alleviate the
harms of present bias. This can help explain why biased agents may not perform so poorly in naturally
competitive settings, and can guide task designers on how to protect present biased agents from harm.
Our work thus paints a more positive picture than much of the existing literature on present bias.
Keywords: present bias · behavioral economics · incentive design
1 Introduction
One of the most influential lines of recent economic research has been behavioral game theory [Ariely and Jones,
2008, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979]. The majority of economics research makes several idealized assump-
tions about the behavior of rational agents to prove mathematical results. Behavioral game theory questions
these assumptions and proposes models of agent behavior that more closely align with human behavior.
Through experimental research [DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006, DellaVigna, 2009], behavioral economists
have observed and codified several common types of cognitive biases, from loss aversion [Kahneman and Tversky,
1979] (the tendency to prefer avoiding loss to acquiring equivalent gains) to the sunk cost fallacy [Arkes and Blumer,
1985] (the tendency to factor in previous costs when determining the best future course of action) to present
bias [Frederick et al., 2002] (the current topic). One primary goal of theorems in game theory is to offer pre-
dictive power. This perspective is especially important in the many computer science applications of these
results, from modern ad auctions to cryptocurrency protocols. If these theorems are to predict human behav-
ior, the mathematical models ought to include observed human biases. Thus, rather than viewing behavioral
game theory as conflicting with the standard mathematical approach, the experimental results of behavioral
game theory can inform more sophisticated mathematical models. This paper takes a step towards this goal,
building on seminal work of Kleinberg and Oren [2014] and Kleinberg et al. [2016, 2017], who formulated a
mathematical model for planning problems where agents are present biased.
Present bias refers to overweighting immediate costs relative to future costs. This is a ubiquitous bias in
human behavior that explains diverse phenomena. The most natural example is procrastination, the familiar
desire to delay difficult work, even when this predictably leads to negative consequences later. Present bias can
also model the tendency of firms to prefer immediate gains to long-term gains and the tendency of politicians
to prefer immediate results to long-term plans. One simple model of present bias[Kleinberg and Oren, 2014,
Kleinberg et al., 2016, 2017] is to multiply costs in the current time period by present bias parameter b
when making plans. This model is a special case of hyperbolic discounting, where costs are discounted in
proportion to how much later one would experience them. But even this special case suffices to induces
time-inconsistency, resulting in a rich set of strategies consistent with human behavior.
Examples of time inconsistent behavior extend beyond procrastination. For example, one might undertake
a project, and abandon it partway through, despite the underlying cost structure remaining unchanged. One
might fail to complete a course with no deadlines, but pass the same course with weekly deadlines. Many
people pay for a gym membership but never use it. Kleinberg and Oren [2014] presented the key insight
that this diverse range of phenomena can all be expressed in a single graph-theoretic framework, which we
describe below.
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Fix a directed, acyclic graph G, with designated source s and sink t. Refer to G as a task graph, where s
is the start of the task and t the end. A path through this graph corresponds to a plan to complete the task;
each edge represents one step of the plan. Each edge has a weight corresponding to the cost of that step.
The goal of an agent is to complete the task while incurring the least cost (i.e., to take the cheapest
path from s to t). An optimal agent will simply follow such a cheapest path. A naive present biased agent
with bias parameter b behaves as follows. At s, they compute their perceived cost for taking each path to t
by summing the weights along this path with the first edge scaled up by b > 1. They choose the path with
the lowest perceived cost and take one step along this path, say to v, and recompute their perceived cost
along each the path from v to t. Notice that such an agent may choose a path at s, take one edge along that
path, and then deviate away from it. This occurs because the agent believes that, after the current choice
of edge, they will pick the path from v to t with lowest true cost. But once they arrive at v, their perceived
cost of a path differs from the true cost, and they pick a path with lowest perceived cost. This is why the
agents are considered naive: they incorrectly assume their future self will behave optimally, and thus exhibit
time-inconsistent behavior. See Figure 1 for an example.
The power of this graph theoretic model is that it allows us to answer questions over a range of planning
problems, and to formally investigate which tasks represent the “worst-case” cost of procrastination. This is
useful both to understand how present-biased behavior differs from optimal behavior and to design tasks to
accommodate present bias. We now briefly summarize the existing literature, to motivate our introduction
of competition to the model.
1.1 Prior Work
The most striking result is that there are graphs where the cost ratio (the ratio of the optimal agent’s cost to
the biased agent’s cost) is exponential in the size of the graph. In addition, all graphs with exponential cost
ratio have a shared structure – they all have a large n-fan as a graph minor (and graphs without exponential
cost ratio do not) [Kleinberg and Oren, 2014, Tang et al., 2017]. So this structure encodes the worst-case
behavior for present bias in the standard model (and we later show how competition is especially effective
in this graph). An n-fan is pictured in Figure 2.
The exponential cost ratio demonstrates the severe harm caused by present bias. How, then, can designers
of a task limit the negative effects of present bias? Kleinberg and Oren [2014] propose a model where a reward
is given after finishing the task, and where the agent will abandon the task if at any point, they perceive
the remaining cost to be higher than the reward. Unlike an optimal agent, a biased agent may abandon a
task partway through. Figure 3 uses the gym membership example from earlier to show this. As a result,
they give the task designer the power to arbitrarily delete vertices and edges, which can model deadlines,
as Figure 4 shows. They then investigate the structure of minimally motivating subgraphs – the smallest
subgraph where the agent completes the task, for some fixed reward. Follow-up work of Tang et al. [2017]
shows that finding any motivating subgraph is NP-hard. Instead of deleting edges, Albers and Kraft [2019]
consider the problem of spreading a fixed reward onto arbitrary vertices to motivate an agent, and find
that this too is NP-hard (with a constrained budget). For other recent work involving present bias, see
[Gravin et al., 2016, Albers and Kraft, 2017, Yan and Yong, 2019, Oren and Soker, 2019, Ma et al., 2019].
The above results all focus on accommodating present bias rather than alleviating it. By that, we mean
that the approaches all focus on whether the agent can be convinced to complete the task – via edge
s
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Fig. 1: The optimal path is (s, x, t) with total cost 6. However, an agent with bias b = 2 will take path (s, v, z, t), with
cost 21. Importantly, when the agent is deciding which vertex to move to from s, they evaluate x as having total cost
12, while v has total cost 11. This is because they assume they will behave optimally at v by taking path (v, y, t).
However, they apply the same bias at v and deviate to the worst possible path.
Competition Alleviates Present Bias in Task Completion 3
s
v1
0
0
c
1 vnt
v2
v3
· · ·
0
c2
c3
cn
Fig. 2: A naive agent with bias b > c > 1 will continually choose to delay finishing the task.
deletion or reward dispersal – but not on guarding the agent from suboptimal behavior induced by their
bias. Kleinberg et al. [2016] partially investigates the latter question in a model involving sophisticated agents,
who plan around their present bias. They consider several types of commitment devices – tools by which
sophisticated agents can constrain their future selves. However, these tools may require more powerful agents
or designers and don’t necessarily make sense for naive agents. We take a different approach – we show that
adding competition can simultaneously explain why present-biased agents may not perform exponentially
poorly in “natural” games and guide task designers in encouraging biased agents towards optimal behavior.
1.2 Our Model
In our model, a task is still represented by a directed, acyclic graph G, with a designated source s and sink
t. There are two naive present-biased agents, A1 and A2, both with bias b, who compete to get to t first.
The cost of a path is the sum of the weights along the path, and time is represented by the number of edges
in the path, which we call the length of the path. In other words, each edge represents one unit of time. The
first agent to get to t gets a reward of r; ties are resolved by evenly splitting the reward. Recall that naive
agents believe that they will behave optimally in the future. Thus, an agent currently at u considers the cost
to reach the target t to be bc(u, v) plus the cost of the optimal path from v to t minus the reward of that
path. More formally, let P(v → t) denote the set of paths from v → t and let P (s→ u) denote the path the
agent has taken to u. Let Cn(u, v) denote the remaining cost that the naive agent believes they will incur
while at u and planning to go to v. The subscript n Then:
Cn(u, v) = b · c(u, v) + min
P (v→t)∈P(v→t)
c(P (v → t))−RA2(P (s→ u) ∪ (u, v) ∪ P (v → t)), (1)
where c(P ) =
∑
e∈P c(e) denotes the cost of path P and RA2(P ) denotes the reward of taking path P from
s to t. This reward depends on the path the other agent A2 takes. Specifically, if A2 takes a path of length
k, and P (s→ u) ∪ (u, v) ∪ P (v → t) is a path of length ℓ, then
RA2(P (s→ u) ∪ (u, v) ∪ P (v → t)) =


r ℓ < k
r
2 ℓ = k
0 otherwise.
We will often rewrite the second term in (1), for ease of notation, as minPv c(Pv) − RA2(Ps→u,v→t). We
sometimes refer instead to the naive agent’s utility, which is the negation of this cost. Given this cost
function, the naive agent chooses the successor of node u via
S(u) = argmin
v:(u,v)∈E
Cn(u, v)
s 2 tv 6
Fig. 3: Let (s, v) represent buying a gym membership and (v, t) represent working out regularly for a month
[Roughgarden, 2016]. At t, the agent receives a reward of 11 due to health benefits. With bias b = 2, the agent
initially believes this task is worth completing, but due to his bias, abandons the task at vertex v, after having
already purchased the membership. This same example works more generally for project abandonment, where (s, v)
could represent the easier planning/conceptual stage while (v, t) represents the more difficult execution.
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Fig. 4: Roughgarden [2016] gave this example to represent a three week course with two assignments. Let vi,j cor-
respond to being in week i with j assignments completed, and suppose the reward of the course is 9. Note that a
student with bias b = 2 will procrastinate until v2,0 and then ultimately abandon the course. However, if the instructor
required the first assignment to be completed by week 2 (which corresponds to removing v2,0), the student would
complete the course.
See Figure 5 for an example.
We now consider how this model of competition might both explain the outcomes of natural games and
inform task designers on how to elicit better behavior from biased agents. For a natural game, consider the
classic example of two companies competing to expand into a new market. Both companies want to launch
a similar product, and are thus considering the same task graph G. The companies are also present biased,
since shareholders often prefer immediate profit maximization/loss minimization over long term optimal
behavior. The first company to enter the market gains an insurmountable advantage, represented by reward
r. If the companies both enter the market at the same time, they split the market share, each getting reward
r/2. This arrangement can be modeled within our framework, and the competition between the companies
should lead them to play a set of equilibrium strategies.
For a designed game, consider the problem of encouraging students to submit final projects before they
are due. The instructor sets a deadline near the end of finals week to give students flexibility to complete the
project when it best fits their schedule. The instructor also knows that (1) students tend to procrastinate and
(2) trying to complete the final project in a few days is much more challenging than spreading it out. They
would like to convince students to work on and possibly submit their assignments early, without changing
the deadline (to allow flexibility for the students whom it suits best). One possible solution would be to give
a small amount of extra credit to the first submission. How might they set this reward to encourage early
submissions?
For another example of a designed game, consider a gym that enjoys increased enrollment at the start
of the year. However, their new customers tend to not visit the gym frequently, and eventually cancel their
membership. To remedy this, they try a new promotion, where new customers are offered free fitness classes,
and the first customer(s) to attend 5 such classes gets a discount on their annual membership. How effective
might such a scheme be at encouraging their new customers to regularly use their gym? Across these three
s u x t
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Fig. 5: Suppose r = 5, the bias b = 2, and assume A2 takes path (s, u, x, t). Then at s, A1 prefers to take u for
perceived cost 4 + 4 + 5 − 2.5 = 10.5. Notice that, due to the reward, the path A1 believes he will take from u is
(u, x, t), despite (u, y, z, t) having lower cost. However, at u, A1 evaluates the lower path to be cheaper, despite losing
the race. This shows that a reward of 5 does not ensure a Nash equilibrium on (s, u, x, t) when b = 2.
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examples, the intuition is that competition will alleviate the harms of present bias by driving agents towards
optimal behavior.
1.3 Summary of Results
We have introduced a model of competition for completing tasks along some graph. We warm up by analyzing
these games absent present bias. Namely, we classify all Nash equilibria for an arbitrary task graph with
unbiased agents. This analysis involves characterizing the set of paths which are the cheapest of a given
length.
We then analyze these games when agents have equal present bias. We show that a very small reward
induces a Nash equilibrium on the optimal path, for any graph with a dominant path. This is a substantial
improvement over the exponential worst case cost ratio experienced without competition. We then discuss
how time-inconsistency defeats the intuition that higher rewards cause agents to prefer quicker paths. Despite
this complication, we provide an algorithm that, given arbitrary graph G and path Q, determines the
minimum reward needed to get a Nash equilibrium on Q, if possible.
Finally, we add an element of bias uncertainty to the model, by drawing agents’ biases iid from distri-
bution F and, for the n-fan, describe the relationship between F and the reward required for a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium on the optimal path. For a wide range of distributions, we find small rewards suffice to ensure
that agents behave optimally (with high probability) in equilibrium. For the stronger goal of ensuring a
constant expected cost ratio, it suffices to offer reward linear in n when F is not heavy-tailed; competition
thus helps here as well.
2 Nash Equilibria with Unbiased Competitors
To build intuition, we first describe the Nash equilibria of these games when agents have no present bias. We
also pinpoint where the analysis will change with the introduction of bias. Notice that each path P in the
graph is a strategy, with payoffs either uw = r− c(P ), ut = r/2− c(P ) or ul = −c(P ), depending on whether
the agent wins, ties or loses, respectively. (These in turn depend on the path taken by the opponent.) We
first rule out dominated paths. Notice that if ul(P ) ≥ uw(P ′), path P ′ is dominated by path P , regardless of
the path taken by the opponent. Also, if uw(P ) ≥ uw(P ′) and |P |≤ |P ′| (where |P | is the number of edges
in P ), then P ′ is dominated. Therefore, for any length k, a single cheapest path of length k will (weakly)
dominate all other paths of length k.
For a given graph G, let P1, . . . , Pn be a minimal set of non-dominated paths, where |Pi|< |Pi+1| for each
1 ≤ i < n. Thus, P1 is the quickest path, the remaining path of minimum length. Summarizing what we
know about these paths:
1. Winning is better than losing: for any pair of paths (Pi, Pj), we know that uw(Pi) > ul(Pj). Thus, in
particular, c(P1)− c(Pn) ≤ r.
2. Longer paths are more rewarding: That is, c(Pi) > c(Pi+1) for each i. Otherwise, Pi+1 would be dominated
since its length is greater. Therefore, in particular, Pn is the cheapest path, i.e., the lowest cost/weight
path from s to t.
We’re interested in characterizing, across all possible task graphs, the pure Nash equilibria, restricting at-
tention to paths in P1, . . . , Pn.
Proposition 1. Let G be an arbitrary task graph. As above, let P1, . . . , Pn be a minimal set of (non-
dominated) paths ordered so P1 is the quickest and Pn the cheapest. Suppose n ≥ 3. Then, path Pi, where
i > 1, is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if c(Pi−1)− c(Pi) ≥ r/2. P1 is a symmetric Nash if and
only if c(P1) − c(Pn) ≤ r/2. There are no other pure Nash equilibria. Therefore, there can be either 0, 1 or
2 pure Nash equilibria.
If n = 2, there is an additional asymmetric pure Nash equilibrium where one player plays the quickest
path P1 and the other plays the cheapest path P2 if c(P1)− c(P2) = r/2.
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Proof. First, suppose n ≥ 3 and the opponent picks Pi, where i > 1. If the agent plays Pi−1, they get
uw(Pi−1). Since winning is always better than losing, the agent need not consider any P>i. Similarly, since
longer paths are cheaper, the agent will not take any P<i−1. Thus, the only choices are between tying
on Pi or winning on Pi−1, so Pi is a symmetric Nash exactly when ut(Pi) ≥ uw(Pi−1), or equivalently
c(Pi−1)− c(Pi) ≥ r/2. Similarly, if the opponent plays P1, the agent chooses between tying on P1 or losing;
in the latter case, losing on the cheapest path Pn gives highest utility. The agents therefore have a symmetric
Nash exactly when tying on P1 is better than losing on Pn, or c(P1)− c(Pn) ≤ r/2.
The only strategy profile we haven’t considered is (Pi−1, Pi); when might this be a Nash equilibrium?
Suppose the opponent plays Pi−1. Either i−1 > 1, and so the best response is Pi−2 or Pi−1, or i−1 = 1, and
so the best response is P1 or Pn. If n ≥ 3, then P2 6= Pn and so (Pi−1, Pi) is not an equilibrium. Otherwise,
if n = 2, then P2 = n and so we get an asymmetric Nash when tying is dominated, i.e. ut(P1) ≤ ul(P2) and
uw(P1) ≥ ut(P2). This is the same as c(P1)− c(P2) = r/2. ⊓⊔
If we apply the same reasoning when the tie-breaking rule is different, for example, when ties are resolved by
both players getting the full reward, any Pi is a (symmetric) pure Nash (and there are no other pure Nash).
On the other hand, if ties result in neither player receiving any reward, the same reasoning implies that we
only have a pure (asymmetric) Nash if n = 2; if n ≥ 3, there are no pure Nash.
We next turn our attention to the biased version of this problem. In the unbiased case, we could take a
“global” view of the graph, and think about paths purely in terms of their overall length and cost. But when
agents are biased, the actual structure of the path is very important; time-inconsistency means that agents
look at paths locally, not globally. It is thus very difficult to cleanly rule out dominated paths – even paths
with exponentially high cost may be taken, as we see next.
3 Nash Equilibria to Elicit Optimal Behavior from Biased Agents
We now assume that the agents are both naive, present biased agents, with shared bias parameter b.1 Our
high-level goal is to show that competition convinces biased agents to take cheap paths, as unbiased agents
do without competition. To this end, we show that a small amount of reward creates a Nash equilibrium on
the cheapest path, first on the n-fan, and then for all graphs which have a dominant path – a cheapest path
that is also the uniquely quickest path.
3.1 The n-fan
We focus first on the n-fan since all graphs with exponential cost ratio for naive agents have a large k-fan
as a graph minor [Kleinberg and Oren, 2014]. For an example of the n-fan, refer back to Figure 2; note in
particular that we assume the bias parameter b > c > 1. We show that, with a very small amount of reward,
competition encourages optimal behavior in naive agents (and further, we fully characterize all equilibria
on the n-fan). To aid our proofs and discussions regarding the n-fan, we define Pi as the path from s to t
containing edge (vi, t). Define P0 as the direct path (s, t).
Theorem 1. Let G be an n-fan, and for any bias b > c, define ε = b − c. Then, with a reward of r ≥ 2ε,
there will be a Nash equilibrium on the optimal path, for two agents with bias b. Further, if r ≤ 2εcn−1, there
is also a Nash equilibrium on the longest path. There are no other pure Nash equilibria, for any value of r.
Proof. We first show that r ≥ 2ε guarantees the existence (not uniqueness) of an optimal pure Nash equi-
librium. Suppose A2 takes the optimal path P0. While standing at s, A1 evaluates the cost to t as b − r/2,
i.e. Cn(s, t) = b− r/2. Similarly, Cn(s, v1) = c, so with r ≥ 2ε, A1 (weakly) prefers to go directly to t. Using
a similar calculation, we can see that when r ≤ 2εcn−1, there is a Nash equilibrium on the longest path,
Pn. This result is somewhat surprising – even with an extremely high reward, the naive agents may take the
longest path. To see why, note that at any vertex vi, the naive agent is only comparing two options, going to
t right now or waiting one step and going to t (since they naively believe they will behave optimally in the
future). Further, when A2 takes the longest path, A1 gets the same reward from (vi, t) and (vi+1, t). Thus,
1 The homogenity of the agents is not particularly important to our results in this section. If the agents have different
bias parameters, our results go through by setting b equal to the larger of the two biases.
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just as the agent prefers to procrastinate in the n-fan, they similarly procrastinate here until vn−1, where
the reward must be very large for them to deviate from the longest path.
To show that there are no other Nash equilibria, suppose A2 takes Pi, where 1 ≤ i < n. As we explained
above, since A1 gets the same reward from paths P1 to Pi−1 and the same reward from paths Pi+1 to Pn,
the agent will always procrastinate to at least vi−1, and if he chooses to go past vi, he will procrastinate until
vn. Now, suppose A1 is standing at vi−1. He will take path Pi−1 if bci−1 − r < ci − r/2, which implies that
r > 2εci−1. Either the reward satisfies this, which shows that Pi is not a Nash equilibrium, or r ≤ 2εci−1, and
A1 continues to vi. Suppose he continues to vi. Then, he (weakly) prefers Pi if bc
i−r/2 ≤ ci+1, which implies
that r ≥ 2εci. However, r ≤ 2εci−1 < 2εci, so r does not satisfy this. Thus, A1 prefers to procrastinate until
vn. In summary, if A2 takes path Pi, A1 either prefers Pi−1 or Pn (depending on the reward). The same
argument applies to A2, so there are no Nash equilibria on paths P1, . . . , Pn−1, regardless of r. ⊓⊔
The ability to enable optimal behavior with just a constant reward stands in striking contrast to the setting
where agents can abandon the task at any time. With neither competition nor internal rewards, the designer
would have to place an exponentially high reward on t (i.e. r ≥ cn) for biased agents to finish the task.2
3.2 Graphs with an Unbiased Dominant Strategy
We now generalize our results to a larger category of graphs. To focus exclusively on the irrationality of present
bias rather than the optimization problem of choosing between cheap, long paths and short, expensive paths,
we focus on graphs with a dominant path – a cheapest path3 that is also the uniquely quickest path. This is
the case in the n-fan. In this setting, the problem is trivial for unbiased agents; simply take this dominant
path. But for biased agents, the problem is still interesting; as the example of the n-fan shows, they may take
paths that are exponentially more costly than the dominant path. However, we prove that a small amount
of competition and reward suffices to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium where both agents take the
dominant path.
Theorem 2. Suppose G is a task graph that has a dominant path, O. Then, a reward of r ≥ 2b ·maxe∈O c(e)
guarantees a Nash equilibrium on O, for two agents with bias b.
Proof. Assume that A2 takes O. Recall that a biased agent perceives the remaining traversal cost of going
to v from t as:
Cn(u, v) = b · c(u, v) + min
Pv
c(Pv)−RA2(Ps→u,v→t)
We know that for any vertex v∗ on the dominant path, the path that minimizes the second term is just the
fragment of the dominant path from v∗ → t (it is both the quickest and cheapest way to get from v∗ to t).
Further, any deviation from the dominant path results in no reward. So, for any v not on the dominant path,
the path that minimizes the second term is again the cheapest path from v → t. Thus, the cost equation
simplifies to:
Cn(u, v) = b · c(u, v) + d(v) − r/2 · 1{D},
where d(v), the distance from v → t, denotes the cost of the cheapest path from v to t (ignoring rewards)
and 1{D} is simply an indicator variable that’s 1 if the agent has not deviated from the dominant path.
Now, let O = (s = v∗0 , v
∗
1 , v
∗
2 , . . . , t = v
∗
l ) be the dominant path and suppose A2 takes this path. In order
for A1 to choose O, we require, for all i:
S(v∗i ) = v
∗
i+1
⇐⇒ v∗i+1 = argmin
v:(v∗i ,v)∈E
b · c(v∗i , v) + d(v)− r/2 · 1{D}
⇐⇒ ∀v : (v∗i , v) ∈ E, bc(v∗i , v) + d(v) ≥ bc(v∗i , v∗i+1) + d(v∗i+1)− r/2
2 However, with internal edge rewards, the designer could spend the same total reward to motivate two agents by
directly adding a reward to the (s, t) edge. This equivalence doesn’t hold in all graphs, as we show in the next
section.
3 There may be other cheapest paths which are longer.
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Fig. 6: A graph with many suboptimal deviations. For an agent with bias b > 2, a designer with access to only edge
rewards must spend O(n) total reward for optimal behavior (b−2 on each (vi, vi+1) edge). In our competitive setting,
only 2(b− 2) total reward is required.
Now, let i be arbitrary, let v 6= v∗i be an arbitrary neighbor of v∗i , and for ease of notation, let c = c(v∗i , v), c∗ =
c(v∗i , v
∗
i+1), d = d(v), and d
∗ = d(v∗i+1). Then, we get the following bound on the reward: r/2 ≥ b(c∗ − c) +
d∗−d. To get a rough sufficient bound, notice that c+d ≥ c∗+d∗, since O is the cheapest path. This implies
that bc∗ > b(c∗− c)+ d∗− d. Thus, it suffices to set r ≥ 2bc∗ in order to ensure S(v∗i ) = v∗i+1. Repeating this
argument for all i, we see that a sufficient reward is r = 2b ·maxe∈O c(e). ⊓⊔
One might object to our claim that r = 2bmaxe∈O c(e) is “small”. To calibrate our expectations, notice that
we can view this problem as an agent trying to pick between several options (i.e. paths), each with their
own reward and cost structure. We want to convince the agent to pick one particular option – namely, the
cheapest path. But it would be unreasonable to expect that a reward significantly smaller than the cost
of any option would sway the agent’s decision. Our theorem above shows that a reward that is at most
proportional to the cheapest option suffices; and in many cases the reward is only a fraction of the cost of
the optimal path (e.g. when the optimal path has balanced cost among many edges).
For a point of comparison, even internal edge rewards (which required the same reward budget as com-
petitive rewards for the n-fan) can require O(n) times as much reward in some instances. To see the intuition,
notice that internal edge rewards must be applied at every step where the agent might want to deviate. The
agent also immediately “consumes” this reward; it doesn’t impact his future decision making. However, the
competitive reward is “at stake” whenever the agent considers deviating; this reward can sway the agent’s
behavior without being immediately consumed. For a concrete example, see Figure 6.
3.3 Increasing the Number of Competitors
A very natural extension to this model would involve more than 2 agents competing. The winner takes all,
and ties are split evenly among those who tied. However, this modification doesn’t change much when trying
to get a Nash equilibrium on the dominant path. The only change is that if m agents are competing, the
reward needed is O(m), as a single agent will get a 1/m fraction of the reward in a symmetric equilibrium.
This is true because there is no way for any agent to beat the dominant path, and claim the entire O(m)
reward for themselves. So if the reward is scaled appropriately (i.e. in Theorem 2 set r ≥ mb·maxe∈O c(e)), we
will still guarantee a Nash equilibrium. Put another way, the per-agent reward needed for a Nash equilibrium
on the dominant path does not change as the number of competitors varies.
4 General Nash Equilibria
In this section, we describe a polynomial time algorithm that, given an arbitrary graph G, path Q and bias b,
determines if Q can be made a Nash equilibrium, and if so, the minimum required reward to do so. Finding
and using this minimum required reward will generally cost much less than the bound given by Theorem 2.
Moreover, this algorithm does not assume the existence of a dominant path. We start by describing how
time-inconsistency defeats the intuition that higher rewards cause agents to prefer quicker paths. We then
present an algorithm which computes the minimum r that results in Q being a symmetric Nash equilibrium.4
4 In fact, the algorithm will return a set of O(n) disjoint intervals containing all values of r that result in Q being a
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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4.1 Higher Rewards Need Not Encourage Quicker Paths
The proof of Theorem 2 suggests the following algorithm for this problem. Start with a reward of 0, and step
along each vertex u ∈ Q, increasing the reward by just enough to ensure A1 stays on Q for one more step
(assuming A2 is taking Q). However, if A1 wants to deviate onto a quicker/tied path at any point, return
⊥; decreasing the reward would cause them to deviate earlier, and, intuitively, it seems that increasing the
reward could not cause them to switch back to Q from the quicker/tied path. After one pass, simply pass
through again to ensure that the final reward doesn’t cause A1 to deviate early on. The following lemma
shows that this algorithm is tractable, by showing that we can compute the minimum reward required for
A1 to stay on Q at any step (and determine whether A1 wants to deviate onto a quicker path).
Lemma 1. Assuming that A2 takes path Q, A1 can efficiently compute minPv c(Pv) − RA2(Ps→u,v→t) by
considering the cheapest path (from v → t), the cheapest path where A1 ties A2, and the cheapest path where
A1 beats A2. (Some of these paths may coincide, and at least one must exist).
Proof. If A1 assumes that A2 takes path Q, then the reward is simply r if the path under consideration wins,
r/2 if it ties, and 0 if it loses. Thus, the minimizer must be the cheapest paths in one of these three cases
(and the cheapest v → t path always exists; the other two may not). Specifically, let k be the number of
edges from v → t on Q, and let c∞, c≤k, c<k denote the cost of the cheapest v → t paths with any number
of edges, at most k edges, and strictly less than k edges respectively. Then, minPv c(Pv)−RA2(Ps→u,v→t) =
min(c∞, c≤k − r/2, c<k − r). These paths can be efficiently computed using the Bellman-Ford algorithm to
determine the cheapest path with at most k edges for any k. ⊓⊔
Unfortunately, while tractable, the approach described above does not yield a correct algorithm. This is
because it relies implicitly on the following two properties, which formalize the intuition that increasing the
reward causes agents to favor quicker paths.
Property 1. If a reward r guarantees a Nash equilibrium on some path Q, any reward r′ > r will either (a),
still result in a Nash equilibrium on Q, or (b), cause an agent to deviate to a quicker path Q′.
Property 2. If A1 deviates from Q onto a quicker/tied path for some reward r, increasing the reward will
not cause them to follow Q.
Both properties are intuitive – if we increase the reward, that should motivate the agent to take a path that
beats their opponent. And vice versa – increasing the reward shouldn’t cause them to shift onto a slower path
or shift between equal length paths. But surprisingly, both properties are false, as the following examples
demonstrate.
s 1 v1
q1
v2
q2
v3 10 t
2
100
(a)
s
q1
v1
q2
v2
q3
8
t
5 v3 v4
x
2
15
(b)
Fig. 7: Graphs which do not exhibit the two expected properties. Unlabeled edges have cost 0.
For Property 1, consider the graph in Figure 7(a) and define paths Q = (s, q1, q2, t), V = (s, v1, v2, v3, t),
and X = (s, v1, t). Suppose both agents have bias 10 and that A2 takes Q. Then a reward of 1 guarantees
that A1 takes Q, as the optimal path from v1 → t would follow V . However, if r = 300, the optimal path
from v1 → t follows X . So, Cn(s, q1) = −148 > Cn(s, v1) = −200 and so the agent goes to v1. But at v1,
the perceived cost of (v1, t) is actually 1000, and so the agent prefers to take path V . Thus, increasing the
reward from 1 to 300 causes the agent to deviate from Q onto a slower path!
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For Property 2, consider the graph in Figure 7(b) and define paths Q, V , and X in the obvious manner.
Again, suppose both agents have bias 10 and that A2 takes Q. Then, with a reward of 10, the optimal path
from v1 → t would follow V . So, Cn(s, v1) = 5 > Cn(s, q1) = 8− 5 = 3, and A1 goes to q1 and thus takes Q.
If r = 2, the optimal path from v1 → t still follows V . But now Cn(s, v1) = 5 < Cn(s, q1) = 8− 1 = 7. Thus,
the agent goes to v1. And here, with b = 10, deviating to X is more attractive than remaining on V , and
thus the agent takes X . So, although A1 deviates from Q to a quicker path for reward 2, they remain on Q
with reward 10.
To summarize, Property 1 fails because present biased agents can take slower paths than they planned
and Property 2 fails because present biased agents can take quicker paths than they planned. In other words,
while higher rewards do tempt agents to take quicker paths, and lower rewards tempt agents towards cheaper
paths, their time inconsistency may make them do the opposite.
4.2 The Algorithm
We now present an algorithm which finds the set of rewards which induce a symmetric Nash equilibrium on
a path Q (Algorithm 1). At a high level, the algorithm narrows down the set I∗ of feasible rewards (rewards
that ensure that Q is a Nash equilibria) by computing the set Iv of rewards that ensure that A1 takes (u, v)
for every (u, v) ∈ Q. The key idea is that we can efficiently compute all r that ensures that A1 prefers
(u, v) over (u, v′) by splitting into cases based on whether the optimal paths from v → t and v′ → t involve
winning, tying, or losing. We now prove the correctness and runtime of the algorithm.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 returns the minimum r that ensures that Q is a Nash equilibrium, or ⊥ if no such
r exists. Further, it runs in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that A2 takes Q. The correctness of the algorithm follows from this lemma:
Lemma 2. Let (u, v) ∈ Q and (u, v′ 6= v) ∈ G be arbitrary. Iv,v′ contains the set of all rewards that ensure
that A1 prefers (u, v) ∈ Q over (u, v′) /∈ Q when standing at u.
Proof. Suppose that the length of the path from u to t in Q is k. From Lemma 1, we know that Cn(u, v) =
{c∞, c≤k − r/2, c<k − r}. Note that c<k represents the cheapest way to win, c≤k the cheapest way to win or
tie, and c∞ the cheapest way to win, tie, or lose (i.e. the cheapest path). So, c∞ ≤ c≤k ≤ c<k. d∞, d≤k, and
d<k are defined similarly with respect to v
′. Without loss of generality, assume that all these values exist
(i.e. that one can win, tie, or lose from v and v′); if this isn’t the case, then all values which rely on them
can be safely removed.
Now, define c∗(r) = min(c∞, c≤k−r/2, c<k−r). This function c∗(r) is simply the piecewise combination of
three linear functions; r1 = 2(c≤k−c∞) and r2 = 2(c<k−c≤k) represent the switching points. Define d∗(r), s1
and s2 similarly. Let I be the pairwise intersection5 {[0, r1], [r1, r2], [r2,∞]}×∩{[0, s1], [s1, s2], [s2,∞]}. Then,
notice that for any I ∈ I, d∗(r) − c∗(r) has a closed form over r ∈ I. Since A1 prefers (u, v) over (u, v′)
if bc(u, v′) + d∗(r) > bc(u, v) + c∗(r), this expression can be solved for r in the interval I, yielding a single
(sub)interval. Let Ir denote this subinterval. Since I is a partition of all possible r, this means that Iv,v′ ,
the union of all intervals Ir , will contain all r which ensure that A1 prefers (u, v) to (u, v
′). ⊓⊔
With this lemma, the proof of correctness is simple. S(u) = v if and only if r is in all Iv,v′ , which is what Iv
tracks. And thus A1 sticks with Q if and only if r is in all Iv, which is exactly what I∗ tracks.
To prove that the algorithm is efficient, notice that Iv,v′ contains at most 5 intervals since |I|≤ 5. Further,
the pairwise intersection of two sets of intervals can be computed in time O(n+m) and is of size ≤ n+m,
where n and m are the size of the input sets. Thus, all the interval intersections are efficient; in general, the
runtime of the algorithm is dominated by the Bellman-Ford subroutine. ⊓⊔
5 To obtain the pairwise intersection of two sets of intervals, simply take the Cartesian product of the two sets to
obtain pairs, and then take the intersection within each pair to obtain a new set of intervals.
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Algorithm 1: Set Nash equilibrium on given path, if possible. Uses Bellman-Ford(v, i) as a subroutine,
to get the cost of the cheapest v → t path with at most i edges. Also uses a subroutine to compute the
pairwise intersection of two sets of disjoint intervals.
Input: A DAG G, with source s and sink t, path Q in G, and bias factor b
Output: The minimum reward r for Q to be a Nash equilibrium, or ⊥ if not possible.
k← len(Q)
I∗ = {[0,∞]}
foreach (u, v) ∈ Q do
k ← k − 1
c∞, c≤k, c<k ← Bellman-Ford(v,∞),Bellman-Ford(v, k),Bellman-Ford(v, k − 1)
r1, r2 ← 2(c≤k − c∞), 2(c<k − c≤k)
Iv = {[0,∞]}
foreach (u, v′ 6= v) ∈ G do
d∞, d≤k, d<k ← Bellman-Ford(v′,∞),Bellman-Ford(v′, k),Bellman-Ford(v′, k − 1)
s1, s2 ← 2(d≤k − d∞), 2(d<k − d≤k)
// ×∩ returns the pairwise intersection of two sets of intervals
I ← {[0, r1], [r1, r2], [r2,∞]} ×∩ {[0, s1], [s1, s2], [s2,∞]}
Iv,v′ ← ∅
foreach I ∈ I do
c∗ ← min(c∞, c≤k − r/2, c<k − r) assuming r ∈ I
d∗ ← min(d∞, d≤k − r/2, d<k − r) assuming r ∈ I
Ir ← subinterval of I containing r s.t. d∗ − c∗ > b(c(u, v)− c(u, v′))
Iv,v′ ← Iv,v′ ∪ {Ir}
Iv ← Iv ×∩ Iv,v′
I∗ ← I∗ ×∩ Iv
if I∗ = ∅ then
return ⊥
else
return smallest r ∈ I∗
5 Extending the Model with Bias Uncertainty and Multiple Competitors
One of the shortcomings of the prior results is that agents are assumed to have publicly known, identical
biases. Neither identical nor known biases are very realistic assumptions. In general, it seems odd for the
agents to know the exact present bias of their opponent, or for the agents to always have the same bias.
From a design perspective, the task designer might not have full knowledge of the agents’ biases, and so may
be unsure how to set the reward. We therefore consider this game played by two agents whose biases are
uncertain. The agents’ biases are represented by random variables B1 and B2 drawn iid from distribution
F , which is publicly known to both the agents and the designer. b1 and b2 correspond to the realizations
of these random variables. Our goal is now to construct, as cheaply as possible, Bayes-Nash equilibria
(BNE) where agents behave optimally with high probability. In this setting, the cost equation becomes
Cn(u, v) = b ·c(u, v)+minPv c(Pv)−EA2 [RA2(Ps→u,v→t)], where the expectation is over A2’s choice of paths.
In this section, we provide a closed form BNE for the n-fan. We start with the case of two agents and
then consider m competing agents. Since we are searching for BNE, we assume that the agents know their
competitor’s strategy.
5.1 Bayes-Nash Equilibria on the n-fan
As before, let Pi represent the path that includes edge (vi, t), and let P0 represent the optimal path. Let
Pr[A2 → P ] denote the probability that A2 takes any path in the set P . 6 The probability is over B2 ∼ F .
Let P>i denote the set of paths {Pi+1, . . . , Pn}. Further, note that for any vertex vi, argminPvi c(Pvi) −
6 For convenience, we write Pi instead of {Pi} for singleton sets.
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EA2 [RA2(Ps→,vi→t)] = (vi, t). This is because going directly to t will always be the cheapest and quickest
path from vi to t. Thus:
Cn(vi−1, vi) = ci − E[R(Pi)]
Cn(vi−1, t) = bci−1 − E[R(Pi−1)]
Further, E[R(Pi)] = r/2Pr[A2 → Pi] + rPr[A2 → P>i]. With this in mind, we start with a basic claim:
Proposition 2. When standing at vertex vi, A1 prefers Pi over Pi+1 if:
r/2Pr[A2 → {Pi, Pi+1}] > ci(b1 − c)
Proof. If A1’s expected utility from going immediately to t is higher than their utility from procrastinating,
then
r · Pr[A2 → P>i] + r/2 · Pr[A2 → Pi]− b1ci > r · Pr[A2 → P>i+1] + r/2 · Pr[A2 → Pi+1]− ci+1.
It follows that
ci(b1 − c) < r(Pr[A2 → P>i]− Pr[A2 → P>i+1]) + r/2(Pr[A2 → Pi]− Pr[A2 → Pi+1])
= r(Pr[A2 → Pi+1]) + r/2(Pr[A2 → Pi]− Pr[A2 → Pi+1])
= r/2Pr[A2 → {Pi, Pi+1}].
⊓⊔
This claim matches intuition; due to the tying mechanism, A1 gets a reward r/2 higher by going to t from
vi if A2 either takes Pi or Pi+1. Note that A1 is comparing Pi to Pi+1 because the latter describes what he
(naively) believes he will do if he procrastinates. We now describe a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the n-fan.
Theorem 4. Let G be an n-fan with reward r and suppose B1, B2 are drawn from distribution B with CDF
F . Let p be the solution to F ( rp2 + c) = p. If p >
1
cn−1+1 , then the following strategy is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium:
P (b) =
{
take P0, b ≤ rp2 + c
take Pn, otherwise
In this equilibrium, for either agent, the probability that they take P0 is p. So the expected cost ratio will be
p+ (1− p)cn.
Proof. Using Proposition 2, at s, A1 prefers P0 over P1 if r/2Pr[A2 → {P0, P1}] > b1 − c. Since Pr[A2 →
P1] = 0, this simplifies to b1 <
rPr[A2→P0]
2 + c. Let Pr[A2 → P0] = p. Then, since the biases are drawn iid,
for this strategy to be a symmetric BNE we need:
Pr[A1 → P0] = Pr[A2 → P0]
Pr[B1 ≤ rp
2
+ c] = p
F
(rp
2
+ c
)
= p
So if p satisfies this equation, by Proposition 2, A1 prefers to go from s to t directly. Now, consider the case
where b1 >
rp
2 + c. Then, A1 prefers to go to v1. Again using Proposition 2, at v1, A1 will prefer t over v2 if
r/2Pr[A2 → {P1, P2}] > c(b1−c), which implies that b1−c < 0. Since we know that b1 > rp2 +c, it’s certainly
the case that b1 > c, so this never holds. Thus, A1 prefers to go to v2. The same argument can be repeated
until the agent reaches vn−1. Then, the agent will prefer t over vn if r/2Pr[A2 → {Pn−1, Pn}] > cn−1(b1−c),
i.e. if b1 <
r(1−p)
2cn−1 + c.
Combining our assumption that b1 >
rp
2 + c with this inequality, we get that p must be less than
1
cn−1+1 .
When this is false, the agent will always prefer Pn when their bias b1 >
rp
2 + c. So, under these conditions,
the given strategy is a BNE. ⊓⊔
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Notice that while the trivial solution p = 0 satisfies F ( rp2 + c) = p, this is not above
1
cn−1+1 , so the trivial
solution is not relevant for finding Bayes-Nash equilibria. And while it’s possible (for some distributions
B and very low rewards r) for the non-trivial solution to p = Pr[B1 ≤ rp2 + c] to be less than 1cn−1+1 ,
for the distributions we have explored this is not the case. One might wonder if there’s a straightforward
generalization of this BNE to other graphs with a dominant path, as in the case without bias uncertainty.
In Appendix B, we discuss challenges that we encountered trying to do this.
We now use the theorem to understand how much reward is required for optimal behavior with high
probability, or a low expected cost ratio (which is a much stronger requirement). Since the expected cost is
p+ cn(1− p), in order for this to be low, 1− p has to be close to 1/cn. Plugging this in to the CDF, we see
that for this to happen, we must have
F
(
r
2
(
1− 1
cn
)
+ c
)
= 1− 1
cn
which essentially requires that exponentially little probability mass (in n) remains after r/2 distance from c.
For an exponential distribution, this requires r to be linear in n, and with a heavier tailed distribution like
the Equal Revenue distribution, this requires r to be exponential in n. But we may be content with simply
guaranteeing optimal behavior with high probability. In that case, so long as r is increasing in n, the agents
will take the optimal path with high probability for at least the equal revenue, exponential, and uniform
distributions. We more precisely explore the probability of optimal behavior and the cost ratios for these
distributions in Appendix A.
5.2 Increasing Number of Competitors
We saw earlier that increasing the number of competitors doesn’t change the per-agent reward needed for
optimal behavior. But one might hope that in Bayesian settings such as bias uncertainty, increasing the
number of agents significantly decreases the per-agent reward needed to encourage optimal behavior – in
particular, as the number of agents increases, the probability of some agent having a very low bias increases.
We provide evidence against this claim. We start by showing that the following strategy is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium with m agents.
Theorem 5. Let G be an n-fan with reward r and suppose there are m + 1 competitors with biases drawn
iid from distribution B with CDF F . Let p be the solution to F (rd(p,m) + c) = p, where:
d(p,m) =
1− (1− p)m(1 + pm)
p(m+ 1)
If p > m−1 log
(
1 +m+ m+12cn−1
)
, the following strategy is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where the probability of
optimal behavior for any agent is p:
P (b) =
{
take P0, b ≤ rd(p,m) + c
take Pn, otherwise
Proof. See Appendix C.
Now, we consider the equal revenue distribution. In the case of two agents, we required exponentially high
reward to get a constant expected cost ratio. Unfortunately, this remains true even as the number of agents
competing goes to infinity.
Theorem 6. Suppose the biases are drawn from an equal revenue distribution shifted over by c. Let s denote
the per agent price, so r = (m+ 1)s. Then, no matter how many agents are competing, for any fixed agent,
the probability that they behave optimally is at most
√
4s+s2−s
2 .
Proof. See Appendix C.
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Earlier results show that the probability of optimal behavior with two competing agents is s−1s , which is
nearly identical to the theorem’s bound as s grows.7 So even as m→∞, the relationship between the reward
and the probability of optimal behavior doesn’t significantly change (and thus the relationship between the
reward and expected cost ratio won’t significantly change). We conjecture that, in general, increasing the
number of agents does not significantly decrease the per-agent reward.
6 Conclusion
We studied the impact of competition on present bias, showing that in many settings where naive agents can
experience exponentially high cost ratio, a small amount of competition drives agents to optimal behavior.
This paper is a first step towards painting a more optimistic picture than much of the work surrounding
present bias. Our results highlight why, in naturally competitive settings, otherwise biased agents might
behave optimally. Further, task/mechanism designers can use our results to directly alleviate the harms of
present bias. This competitive model might be a more natural model than other motivation schemes, such
as internal edge rewards, and is able to more cheaply ensure optimal behavior. Our work also leaves open
many exciting questions.
First, with bias uncertainty, we only obtain concrete results on the n-fan. So one obvious direction is to
determine which graphs have Bayes-Nash equilibria on the optimal path, and what these equilibria look like.
Second, we explore two “dimensions” of competition – the amount of reward and the number of competitors,
finding that the latter is unlikely to be significant. Another interesting goal is thus to explore new dimensions
of competition.
Lastly, we could extend our work beyond cost ratios, moving to the model where agents can abandon their
path at any point. For one, this move would allow us to integrate results on sunk-cost bias, represented as
an intrinsic cost for abandoning a task that’s proportional to the amount of effort expended. Kleinberg et al.
[2017] show that agents who are sophisticated with regard to their present-bias, but naive with respect
to their sunk cost bias can experience exponentially high cost before abandoning their traversal (this is
especially interesting because sophisticated agents without sunk cost bias behave nearly optimally). Can
competition alleviate this exponential worst case? There are also interesting computational questions in this
model. For instance, given a fixed reward budget r, is it possible to determine in polynomial time if one can
induce an equilibrium where both agents traverse the graph? Such problems are NP-hard for other reward
models, but may be tractable with competition. Overall, the abandonment setting has several interesting
interactions with competition that we have not explored.
7 To see this, note that
√
4s+s2−s
2
can be written as 1−
√
4s+s2−s√
4s+s2+s
and s−1
s
= 1− 1
s
. Further,
√
4s+s2−s√
4s+s2+s
≈ 2
2+2s
as s
grows, since
√
4s+ s2 ≈ s+ 2. So, both probabilities are 1−O(s−1).
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A Concrete Distributions for Bias Uncertainty
In this section, we more precisely describe the relationship between r and p (the probability of optimal
behavior in the BNE from Theorem 4) for several distributions.
Lemma 3. Suppose B1 and B2 are drawn from an equal revenue distribution that’s shifted over by c (so
b1, b2 > c). Then, for any r ≥ 2, the probability of optimal behavior in the BNE from Theorem 4 is 1 − 2r ,
and thus the expected cost is 1− 2r + 2c
n
r .
Proof. The equal revenue distribution described has CDF F (z) = 1− 1z−c+1 . Now, applying Theorem 4:
1− 1rp
2 + c− c+ 1
= p
rp
2
+ 1− 1 = p
(rp
2
+ 1
)
(r
2
)
p2 +
(
1− r
2
)
p = 0
p = 0 or
r − 2
r
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So with reward r ≥ 2, p = r−2r . ⊓⊔
Because this distribution is heavy tailed, the expected cost remains exponential unless r is exponential.
However, if r is any increasing function of n, then w.h.p. both agents will take the optimal path. Now, we
look at the exponential distribution.
Lemma 4. Suppose B1 and B2 are drawn from an exponential distribution, Exp(λ), that’s shifted over by
c (so b1, b2 > c). Then, for any r, the probability of optimal behavior in the BNE from Theorem 4 is at least
p ≥ 1−O(e−λr/2), and thus the expected cost is 1−O(e−λr/2) +O(cne−λr/2).
Proof. We first solve for p in Theorem 4:
Pr[B1 ≤ rp
2
+ c] = p
1− e−λ( rp2 +c−c) = p
1− e−λrp2 = p
ln(1− p)
p
=
−λr
2
p = 0 or 1 +
2W (−λr/2 · e−λr/2)
λr
Where W refers to the Lambert W function, i.e. W (z) = x ⇐⇒ xex = z. The Taylor series of W around 0
is:
W (x) =
∞∑
n=1
(−n)n−1
n!
xn = x− x2 + 3
2
x3 − . . .
For our application, notice that x = −λr/2 · e−λr/2 is very small; thus, we let W (x) = x−O(x2). So:
p ≥ 1−O(e−λr/2)
⊓⊔
This means that if r = O(n/λ), we get a constant expected cost ratio (and extremely high probability of
optimal behavior). We finally consider the simple example of a uniform distribution.
Lemma 5. Suppose B1 and B2 are drawn from the uniform distribution, Unif [c, d] (so b1, b2 > c). Then,
for r ≥ 2(d− c), the probability of optimal behavior in the BNE from Theorem 4 is 1. For all r < 2(d− c),
this probability is zero.
Proof. For the first part of the lemma, note that if rp/2 + c ≥ d, then F (rp/2 + c) = 1, so p = 1 holds if
r/2 + c ≥ d, or equivalently, r ≥ 2(d− c). If we assume rp/2 + c < d, then using CDF F (z) = z−cd−c to solve
for p:
rp
2 + c− c
d− c = p
r
2
p = (d− c)p
Since r < 2(d− c), this is satisfied only with p = 0. ⊓⊔
More generally, for any distribution bounded by b∗, computing the reward that guarantees a Nash equilibrium
if both agents had public biases b∗ also suffices to guarantee a BNE in this setting (and in particular, this
BNE always results in optimal behavior). For the case of the uniform distribution, this is the only reward
that ever results in optimal behavior. As a direct consequence of this lemma, the expected cost ratio is 1
with the reward r = O(d).
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B Difficulties Finding Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Arbitrary Graphs
The simplest way to generalize our BNE from the n-fan would be to consider the following schematic:
Sy(b) =
{
take O, b ≤ y
take P, for some fixed P otherwise
Where y ideally would depend on only the costs in the graph, the reward r, and p, the solution to F (y) = p.
So the agents would either take the optimal path, if their bias was sufficiently small, or some path P that can
“catch” agents with high bias. In the fan graph, this was the path around the fan. That path happened to
be the natural path for any bias, and perhaps more importantly, the “limiting” natural path as b→∞ (i.e.
the greedy/myopic path, where you simply take the lowest cost edge at each step). But neither of these ideas
generalize; this simple schematic will not produce a BNE in an arbitrary graph, as the following counter
example shows.
Consider the modified 3-fan below. Let 1 < c1 = c < c
2 < c2 < c
2
2 < c3. So the cost of the edges to t
increase faster than doubling.
s
v1
0
0
c2
1
c1 = c
v3t
v2
0
c3
We claim the following:
Proposition 3. There is no symmetric BNE for this graph that assigns positive probability to only two
paths, assuming the bias is drawn from a distribution with support on [1,∞].
The main idea behind the proof is to notice first that path P0 and P3 will always be taken, when the bias
is very low or very high. We then define the interval of biases (the interval depends on the reward, costs,
and probability of optimal behavior) wherein A1 wants to take P1 or P2 and argue that at least one of the
intervals must be non-empty.
Proof. Note that as b := b1 → ∞, for any fixed reward, the agent will always take the greedy option of
choosing the cheapest edge at every step. This will cause them to take the path P3. Further if their bias is
below c1, they will take the optimal path, P0. So, any BNE must assign positive probability to those two
paths. We now prove, by contradiction, that it must assign positive probability to either P1 or P2.
Let p be Pr[A2 → P0] and 1−p = Pr[A2 → P3]. At s, A1 prefers to procrastinate to v1 when b > c+rp/2,
so suppose this is the case. At v1, A1 would take P1 if:
bc− r(1 − p) < c2 − r(1 − p)
b < c2/c
So, if b ∈ [c+ rp/2, c2/c], A1 would take P1. If this interval is non-empty, then we’re done. If it’s not, then:
c2c > c+ rp/2
rp >
2c2
c
− 2c
r >
2c2 − 2c2
cp
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If the reward is at least this high, then A1 always goes to v2 at v1. Now, at v2 (where we know b > c2/c),
A1 takes P2 when:
bc2 − r(1 − p) < c3 − r
2
(1− p)
bc2 < c3 +
r
2
(1− p)
b <
2c3 + r(1 − p)
2c2
As before, if b ∈ [c2/c, 2c3+r(1−p)2c2 ], A1 would take P2. We claim that this interval must be non-empty. Suppose
it wasn’t, and c2/c >
2c3+r(1−p)
2c2
. Then:
r(1 − p) + 2c3 < 2c22/c
r <
2c22 − 2c3c
c(1 − p)
However, this upper bound causes a contradiction – from the definitions, we know that c22 < c3, so clearly
c22 < c3c, and thus this bound requires r < 0. This contradicts our typical requirement that r ≥ 0, but even
ignoring this requirement, this also contradicts our earlier bound that r > 2c2−2c
2
cp .
So by contradiction, A1 will either take P1 or P2 with positive probability. ⊓⊔
In general, the main challenge with finding a BNE is finding a set of paths {Pi} and bias intervals {Ii} such
that, for all intervals Ii, A1 must want to traverse Pi if their bias falls in Ii. The complication is that A1’s
decision to traverse Pi depends on the distribution over A2’s choice of path, which is induced by the intervals
Ii and the bias distribution. These interweaving constraints are difficult to manage even for simple graphs,
as this preliminary result suggests.
C Adding More Competitors with Bias Uncertainty
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Suppose all agents besides A1 follow P (b). Then, at s, A1 views procrastinating
to v1 as having reward −c+ rPr[Ai → Pn]m, using the iid assumption and the fact that A1 will only win if
everyone else has a bias which, according to P (b), causes them to procrastinate. On the other hand, going
directly from s to t has utility −b1 + E[R], where N is a random variable measuring how many agents take
P0 and R =
r
N+1 is the random variable corresponding to the reward. Notice that N ∼ Bin(m, p), where
p = Pr[Ai → P0]. We now use the following claim:
Claim. Let N ∼ Bin(m, p). Then:
E
[
1
N + 1
]
=
1− (1 − p)m+1
p(m+ 1)
Proof. First, using the definition of the expectation and simplifying:
E
[
1
N + 1
]
=
m∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
m
i
)
pi(1− p)m−i
=
m∑
i=0
(1− p)m
m+ 1
(
m+ 1
i+ 1
)(
p
1− p
)i
=
(1− p)m+1
p(m+ 1)
m∑
i=0
(
m+ 1
i+ 1
)(
p
1− p
)i+1
Now, notice that the binomial theorem says:(
1 +
p
1− p
)m+1
=
(
m+ 1
0
)(
p
1− p
)0
+
m+1∑
j=1
(
m+ 1
j
)(
p
1− p
)j
(
1 +
p
1− p
)m+1
− 1 =
m∑
i=0
(
m+ 1
i+ 1
)(
p
1− p
)i+1
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Plugging this back in:
E
[
1
N + 1
]
=
(1− p)m+1
p(m+ 1)
((
1 +
p
1− p
)m+1)
=
(
(1 − p)
(
1 + p1−p
))m+1
− (1− p)m+1
p(m+ 1)
=
1− (1− p)m+1
p(m+ 1)
⊓⊔
From the claim, we see that E[R] = r(1−(1−p)
m+1)
p(m+1) . Now, A1 prefers to go immediately from s to t when:
−b1 + E[R] > −c+ r(1 − p)m
b1 < r
(
1− (1− p)m+1
p(m+ 1)
− (1− p)m
)
+ c
= r
(
1− (1− p)m(1 + pm)
p(m+ 1)
)
+ c
For ease of notation, let d(p,m) = 1−(1−p)
m(1+pm)
p(m+1) . As a sanity check, one can show that d(p,m) is always
positive (to show that the expected reward will always be positive).
Claim. d(p,m) > 0
Proof. We want:
1− (1− p)m(1 + pm)
p(m+ 1)
> 0
1− (1 − p)m(1 + pm) > 0
1 > (1− p)m(1 + pm)
1 > e−pm(1 + pm) (1 + x ≤ ex)
epm > 1 + pm
And the last line holds by again using the fact that 1 + x ≤ ex. ⊓⊔
We’ve shown that when the agent’s bias is less than rd(p,m) + c, they prefer P0 to Pn (assuming everyone
else takes P0 with probability p). Now, if their bias is above rd(p,m) + c, we know that they will progress
to v1. We claim that they will surely procrastinate all the way to vn−1. To see why, since we are analyzing
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the agent assumes that all other agents follow the equilibrium strategy, which
means that all their competitors take either P0 or Pn. Thus, the rewards from paths P1 to Pn−1 are all
identical. So by the construction of the n-fan, the agent procrastinates until vn−1. If p is not extremely low,
they will then go to vn, as the following claim demonstrates.
Claim. If p > log(1 +m+ m+12cn−1 )/m and the agent has bias b > rd(p,m) + c, then the agent takes path Pn.
Proof. We’ve just shown that if b > rd(p,m) + c, they go to vn−1. From there, going to t has utility
−b1cn−1 + r(1 − p)m and going to vn has utility −cn + r/2(1− p)m. So, the agent prefers t when:
−cn + r/2(1− p)m < −b1cn−1 + r(1 − p)m
(b1 − c)cn−1 < r/2 · (1− p)m
b1 <
r(1 − p)m
2cn−1
+ c
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So, if the agents bias is in the interval [rd(p,m)+ c, r(1−p)
m
2cn−1 + c], they prefer to deviate from the equilibrium
strategy (in Theorem 5) by going to vn−1. We now compute when this interval is empty:
r
1 − (1− p)m(1 + pm)
p(m+ 1)
+ c >
r(1 − p)m
2cn−1
+ c
1− (1− p)m(1 + pm)
p(m+ 1)
>
(1− p)m
2cn−1
2cn−1(1− (1− p)m(1 + pm)) > (1− p)mp(m+ 1)
2cn−1 > (1− p)mp(m+ 1) + 2cn−1(1− p)m(1 + pm)
2cn−1 > (1− p)m(2cn−1 + pm(2cn−1 + 1) + p)
2cn−1 > e−pm(2cn−1 + pm(2cn−1 + 1) + p) (Since (1− p)m ≤ e−pm)
epm > 1 +mp
2cn−1 + 1
2cn−1
+
p
2cn−1
epm > 1 +m
2cn−1 + 1
2cn−1
+
1
2cn−1
(Since p ≤ 1)
epm > 1 +m+
1
2cn−1(m+ 1)
p >
log(1 +m+ m+12cn−1 )
m
This is thus sufficient for the agent to take path Pn. ⊓⊔
So, by the claim, if p > log(1 +m+ m+12cn−1 )/m, the following strategy is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium:
P (b) =
{
take P0, b ≤ rd(p,m) + c
take Pn, otherwise
Which is exactly what the theorem states. ⊓⊔
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6). Recall that, for the equal revenue distribution shifted by c, F (z) = 1− 1z−c+1 .
Now, we attempt to solve F (rd(p,m) + c) = p for p:
1− 1
rd(p,m) + 1
= p
rd(p,m) + 1− 1 = p(rd(p,m) + 1)
rd(p,m) = p(rd(p,m) + 1)
rd(p,m)(1 − p) = p
r(1 − p) · 1− (1− p)
m(1 + pm)
p(m+ 1)
= p
(1− p) · 1− (1− p)
m(1 + pm)
p2
=
m+ 1
r
We only need an upper bound on p, not to solve this equation for general m. Implicit differentiation shows
that p is increasing in m when the above equation is satisfied. =Given this fact, an upper bound for p is
simply the limit as m→∞, which is:
1− p
p2
=
1
s
s− sp− p2 = 0
p =
√
4s+ s2 − s
2
⊓⊔
